## Recreational Demand Model Overview Core Stakeholder Workshop 11/8



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## Objectives of the summer flounder recreational demand model (RDM)

1. Predict the impact of management strategies on:

- harvest;
- discards;
— angler welfare;
- other metrics of fishing success?

2. Evaluate economic and biological tradeoffs posed by alternative management strategies, such as:

- +/- bag limits;
] +/- minimum sizes, slots;
- other types of mgt. strategies?


## Literature

- Similar applications of recreational demand modeling in fishery settings:
प Carr-Harris and Steinback 2020 - striped bass
- Lee et. al 2017- GoM cod and haddock

Lee et al. (2017)
Results - predicted spawning stock biomass 3 years out



## Lee et al. (2017) <br> Results - predicted removals next year




## Lee et al. (2017) <br> Results - predicted angler welfare next year



Figure 4. Aggregate Angler CV in 2014 Evaluated Over Seven Alternative Fishing Policies
Note: Policy A is used as the baseline policy.

## Approach to the summer flounder RDM

1. Behavioral model

- Estimates angler preferences/drivers of fishing effort
- Uses data from a 2010 choice experiment survey

2. Fishery simulation

- Simulates the fishery using historical catch and effort data from MRIP
- Incorporates the results of behavioral model
- Measures the effect of mgt. strategies on anglers and fish


## Estimate angler preferences Angler behavior model

- Data from a 2010 choice experiment (CE) survey
- Stated preference method for non-market valuation
- Non-market goods or attributes do not have well-defined markets, necessitating the use of alternative methods of valuation
- CEs ask people a series of questions that can be used to infer economic values, such as willingness-to-pay (WTP)
- Allow for valuation of virtually any policy-relevant attributes of interest (e.g., harvest, regulations, environmental quality), including those for which observational data are nonexistent or do not vary


## Choice experiment data

- 2010 saltwater fishing survey
- Administered in conjunction with MRIP intercepts
- Four regional sub-versions (ME-NY, NJ, DE/MD, VA/NC)
- 10,244 surveys distributed, 3,234 returned (RR=31.5\%)


## Saltwater Recreational Fishing Survey



Improve your fishing experiences!


Sponsored by NOAA Fisheries (National Marine Fisheries Service), Office of Science and Technology http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st5/index.html
This survey is voluntary and all responses are confidential.

## Example choice experiment question

## SEction B：Saltwater Fishing Trips

The following questions help us understand tradeoffs made by anglers when they go fishing．
Compare Trip A，Trip B，and Trip C in the table below，then answer questions 2A and 2B．
Compare only the trips on this page．Do not compare these trips to trips on other pages in this survey．

| Trip Features | Trip A | Trip B | Trip C |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ᄂ 亠凶 Regulations | 2 Fluke， 20 ＂or larger | 5 Fluke，21＂or larger | Go fishing for striped bass or bluefish |
| E Fish Caught | 0 to 4 Fluke，25＂TL | 8 Fluke，12＂TL |  |
| いロ Fish Kept | 0 to 2 Fluke | 0 Fluke |  |
| $\simeq \sim$ Regulations | 10 Bl ．Sea Bass， $12.5{ }^{\prime \prime}$ or larger | 15 Bl ．Sea Bass， $10^{\prime \prime}$ or larger |  |
| 芴 | 15 Bl ．Sea Bass， $9^{\prime \prime}$ TL | 20 Bl ．Sea Bass，12＂TL |  |
| $\pm$ Fish Kept | 0 Black Sea Bass | 15 Black Sea Bass |  |
| ๑ Regulations | 15 Scup， $11.5^{\prime \prime}$ or larger | 20 Scup，11＂or larger |  |
| 认 ¢ ¢ Fish Caught | 80 Scup，13＂TL | 60 Scup， $10^{\prime \prime} \mathrm{TL}$ |  |
| 2 Fish Kept | 15 Scup | 0 Scup |  |
| Total Trip Cost | \＄90 | \＄105 | \＄160 |

## Definitions：

－Regulations：The legal minimum size restriction and bag limit for this trip．
－Fish caught：The number of fish caught on this trip and the total length（TL）of those fish．
－Fish kept：The number of fish you can legally keep on this trip．
－Total trip cost：Your portion of the costs associated with this trip，including bait，ice，fishing equipment purchase or rental，daily license fees，boat rental fees，boat fuel，trip fees，and round trip transportation costs associated with traveling to and from the fishing location．Travel costs may include vehicle fuel，car rental，tolls，airfare，and parking．

Choose your favorite trip．（Please mark only one trip with a $\square$ or a 図．）
Trip A $\square$
Trip B $\square$
Trip C
I would not go saltwater fishing

## Behavioral model

- Random utility model framework
- $U_{i}=V_{i}+e$
- Select alternative with largest $U$
- Econometric model:
$V_{i}=f(\sqrt{\# \text { SF kept }}, \sqrt{\# \text { SF released }}, \sqrt{\# \text { other fish kept }}$,
$\sqrt{\# \text { other fish released }}$, Trip cost, Striper/bluefish alternative, No trip alternative)


## Behavioral model results

Table 2 . Estimated utility parameters from panel mixed logit models.

|  | Mean parameters | ME-NY |  | NJ |  | DE/MD |  | VA/NC |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Estimate | St. Error | Estimate | St. Error | Estimate | St. Error | Estimate | St. Error |
| Fluke parameters | trip cost | $-0.012^{+* *}$ | 0.000 | -0.009*** | 0.000 | -0.009*** | 0.000 | $-0.008^{* * *}$ | 0.000 |
|  | $\sqrt{\text { SF kept }}$ | $0.559^{+* *}$ | 0.063 | $0.762^{* * *}$ | 0.067 | $0.807^{* *}$ | 0.051 | $0.521 * * *$ | 0.033 |
|  | $\sqrt{\text { SF released }}$ | -0.061 | 0.046 | 0.013 | 0.043 | 0.040 | 0.034 | $0.108^{* * *}$ | 0.022 |
| BSB parameters | $\sqrt{\text { BSB kept }}$ | $0.275^{+* *}$ | 0.034 | $0.174^{* *}$ | 0.034 | 0.239*** | 0.027 | $0.192^{* *}$ | 0.019 |
|  | $\sqrt{\text { BSB released }}$ | -0.021 | 0.024 | 0.015 | 0.025 | -0.011 | 0.020 | 0.020 | 0.013 |
|  | $\sqrt{\text { scup kept }}$ | $0.075^{+* *}$ | 0.021 | $0.097^{* * *}$ | 0.021 |  |  |  |  |
|  | $\sqrt{\text { scup released }}$ | -0.010 | 0.015 | -0.039** | 0.016 |  |  |  |  |
|  | $\sqrt{\text { WF kept }}$ |  |  | $0.394^{* *}$ | 0.056 | 0.379** | 0.045 | $0.231^{* * *}$ | 0.032 |
|  | $\sqrt{\text { WF released }}$ |  |  | 0.093** | 0.044 | $0.064^{*}$ | 0.036 | 0.030 | 0.024 |
|  | $\sqrt{\text { RD kept }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  | $0.454^{* * *}$ | 0.040 |
|  | $\sqrt{R D \text { released }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  | $0.081 * * *$ | 0.025 |
|  | do not fish | $-2.641^{+4 *}$ | 0.252 | $-2.095^{* * *}$ | 0.288 | $-2.963^{* * *}$ | 0.259 | $-3.908^{* * *}$ | 0.259 |
|  | fish for other species | $1.429^{* * *}$ | 0.181 | $1.139^{* * *}$ | 0.208 | 0.645*** | 0.159 | $0.454^{* * *}$ | 0.121 |
|  | No. choices | 3460 |  | 2768 |  | 4514 |  | 8340 |  |
|  | No. anglers | 449 |  | 359 |  | 594 |  | 1072 |  |
|  | Pseudo $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.332 |  | 0.274 |  | 0.323 |  | 0.307 |  |
|  | LL | -3203.6 |  | -2785.2 |  | -4236.5 |  | -8010.3 |  |
|  | LL(0) | -4796.6 |  | -3837.3 |  | -6257.7 |  | -11561.7 |  |
|  | AIC | 6441.1 |  | 5612.3 |  | 8506.9 |  | 16062.6 |  |
|  | BIC | 6569.2 |  | 5765.9 |  | 8639.6 |  | 16239.4 |  |

Notes: *, , and ${ }^{* * *}$ represent significance at the $10 \%, 5 \%$, and $1 \%$ level of significance, respectively. SF $=$ summer flounder, $\mathrm{BSB}=$ black sea bass, $\mathrm{WF}=$ weakfish, $\mathrm{RD}=$ red drum.

## Estimated willingness-to-pay for keeping fish (ME-NY)


keeping 1 summer flounder $=$ keeping $\sim 2$ black sea bass
$=$ keeping $\sim 7.5$ scup

Willingness-to-pay for the first fish kept:

## Fishery simulation overview

- Historical MRIP catch and effort data is used to simulate individual fishing trips under baseline and alternative mgt. strategies.
- Under the two scenarios, calculate:
- expected utility;
- probability of taking a trip;
- angler welfare;

- other metrics of fishing success?


## Example choice occasion

Trip outcomes from a change in attributes based on 100 utility parameter draws.

| Trip attributes | Baseline <br> scenario $\left(\mathrm{s}^{0}\right)$ | Alternative <br> scenario $\left(\mathrm{s}^{1}\right)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| \# summer flounder kept | 1 | 3 |
| \# summer flounder released | 4 | 1 |
| \# black sea bass keep | 1 | 4 |
| \# black sea bass released | 3 | 0 |
| \# scup kept | 0 | 0 |
| \# scup kept | 0 | 0 |
| Trip cost | $\$ 55.85$ | $\$ 55.85$ |

Trip outcomes

| Trip probability | 0.51 | 0.69 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(0.44,0.58)$ | $(0.62,0.75)$ |
| Expected BSB harvest <br> (prob. $\times$ BSB keep) | 0.50 | 2.75 |
| Expected BSB releases <br> (prob. $\times$ BSB release) | $(0.43,0.57)$ | $(2.49,3.00)$ |
| Expected BSB mortality <br> (harvest $+0.1 \times$ releases) | $(0.51,1.73)$ | 0 |
|  | 0.66 | 2.75 |
| $\mathrm{CV} \mathrm{s}{ }^{0} \rightarrow \mathrm{~s}^{1}$ | $-\$ 64.90$ |  |
|  | $(\$ 52.45, \$ 77.35)$ |  |

## Fishery simulation method

1. Simulate fishing trips, with each assigned:

- \#'s fish kept/released
- sizes of fish kept/released
- trip cost

2. Calibrate the model to baseline year (2019) MRIP effort estimates
3. Re-run under alternative conditions, calculate changes in metrics of interest

## Fishery simulation data

- Catch-per-trip: MRIP aggregated across 3 regions (MA-NY, NJ, DE-NC)
- Catch-at-length: MRIP aggregated across 3 regions in baseline year, adjusts to the size distribution of the population in prediction years
- Regulations: state level
- Behavioral parameters: 4 regions (MA-NY, NJ, DE/MD, VA/NC)
- Trip cost data: state level by mode from 2017 expenditure survey data


## Fishery simulation Data

## 2019 actual regulations

| State | Period | Dates | Fluke regs. | BSB regs. | Scup regs. | Weakfish Regs. | Red drum regs. | Estimated \# directed fluke trips |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MA | 1 | Jan 1. - May 17 | closed | closed | 30 fish, 9" | N/A | N/A | 0 |
| MA | 2 | May 18 -Sep. 8 | 5 fish, 17" | 5 fish, 15" | 50 fish, 9 " | N/A | N/A | 92,813 |
| MA | 3 | Sep. 9 - Oct. 9 | 5 fish, 17" | closed | 30 fish, 9" | N/A | N/A | 9,978 |
| MA | 4 | Oct. 10 - Dec 31 | closed | closed | 30 fish, 9 " | N/A | N/A | 1,460 |
| NJ | 1 | Jan. 1 - May 14 | closed | closed | 50 fish, 9 " | 1 fish, 13" | N/A | 2,463 |
| NJ | 2 | May 15 - June 30 | 3 fish, 18" | 10 fish, 12.5" | 50 fish, 9 " | 1 fish, 13" | N/A | 960,362 |
| NJ | 3 | July 1-Aug. 31 | 3 fish, 18" | 2 fish, 12.5" | 50 fish, 9 " | 1 fish, 13" | N/A | 2,763,076 |
| NJ | 4 | Sep. 1-Sep. 30 | 3 fish, 18" | closed | 50 fish, 9 " | 1 fish, 13" | N/A | 810,316 |
| NJ | 5 | Oct. 1-Oct. 31 | closed | 10 fish, 12.5" | 50 fish, 9 " | 1 fish, 13" | N/A | 41,088 |
| NJ | 6 | Nov. 1 - Dec. 31 | closed | 15 fish, 13" | 50 fish, 9 " | 1 fish, 13" | N/A | 1,891 |

## Fishery simulation - data

- Catch-at-length
- In baseline year, use distribution fitted (gamma) to recent MRIP data
- In prediction year, calculate and fit based on population abundance-at-length


## Abundance-based catch-at-length example (fluke)



## Fishery simulation

## Data

- Catch-per-trip based on recent MRIP data
- Account for correlation in fluke and BSB catch through the use of copulas
$\square$ Specify marginal distributions for each series, select copula function that generates data with similar correlation structure
- Catch-per-trip of other species assumed independent


## Correlation between fluke and BSB

Observed catch on directed fluke trips, MA-NY 2019


Observed catch on directed BSB trips, MA-NY 2019


## Fishery simulation <br> Calibration

- Calibrate the model to baseline year (2019)
- Select $N$ simulated trips so that $\sum_{n=1}^{N} p=$ actual \# of trips


## Calibration results for summer flounder <br> Harvest

Table 1. Simulated vs. estimated 2019 fluke harvest (\#'s fish)

| state | Simulation (95\% CI) | $\begin{gathered} \text { MRIP } \\ (95 \% \mathrm{CI}) \end{gathered}$ | Difference | \% difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MA | 57,627 | 55,386 | 2,241 | 4.0 |
|  | $(56,938$ 58,316) | $(26,630$ 84,142) |  |  |
| RI | 104,350 | 213,592 | -109,242 | -51.1 |
|  | $(103,250$ 105,449) | $(59,161$ 368,022) |  |  |
| CT | 91,145 | 89,843 | 1,302 | 1.4 |
|  | $(90,136$ 92,153) | $(56,326$ 123,360) |  |  |
| NY | 709,441 | 561,173 | 148,268 | 26.4 |
|  | $(701,566$ 717,316) | $(321,106$ 801,240) |  |  |
| NJ | 1,058,311 | 1,108,158 | -49,847 | -4.5 |
|  | $(1,047,499 \quad 1,069,124)$ | $(740,721$ 1,475,595) |  |  |
| DE | 55,132 | 91,025 | -35,893 | -39.4 |
|  | $(54,733$ 55,532) | $(58,913$ 123,137) |  |  |
| MD | 75,912 | 79,371 | -3,459 | -4.4 |
|  | $(75,395 \quad 76,429)$ | $(66,857$ 91,885) |  |  |
| VA | 106426 | 149,785 | -43,359 | -28.9 |
|  | $(105,963$ 106,889) | $(72,911 \quad 226,659)$ |  |  |
| NC | 8,660 | 34,895 | -26,235 | -75.2 |
|  | $(8,604 \quad 8,716)$ | $(23,833$ 45,956) |  |  |
| Total | 2,267,008 | 2,383,228 | -116,223 | -4.9 |
|  | (2244221 2289795) | $(1,908,190 \quad 2,858,266)$ |  |  |

## Calibration results for summer flounder Discards

| state | Simulation (95\% CI) | $\begin{gathered} \text { MRIP } \\ (95 \% \text { CI) } \end{gathered}$ | Difference | \% error |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MA | 226,302 | 224,421 | 1,881 | 0.84 |
|  | (224,099 224,099) | $(83,344$ 365,498) |  |  |
| RI | 1,168,887 | 1,319,352 | -150,465 | -11.40 |
|  | $(1,159,973 \quad 1,177,801)$ | $(400,1942,238,510)$ |  |  |
| CT | 1,025,365 | 1,065,404 | -40,039 | -3.76 |
|  | $(1,017,481 \quad 1,033,250)$ | (674,356 1,456,452) |  |  |
| NY | 8,620,060 | 9,001,801 | -381,741 | -4.24 |
|  | $(8,551,801 \quad 8,688,317)$ | $(6,144,099 \quad 11,859,503)$ |  |  |
| NJ | 12,703,465 | 13,068,170 | -364,705 | -2.79 |
|  | $(12,607,124 \quad 12,799,806)$ | (8,729,440 17,406,900) |  |  |
| DE | 663,235 | 441,178 | 222,057 | 50.33 |
|  | (660,637 665,833) | (302,647 579,708) |  |  |
| MD | 902,174 | 938,193 | -36,019 | -3.84 |
|  | $(898,782$ 905,567) | $(781,958$ 1,094,428) |  |  |
| VA | 1,307,589 | 1,367,380* | -61,986 | -4.53 |
|  | $(1,304,510$ 1,310,668) | (761,049 1,973,711) |  |  |
| NC | 39,621 | 1,469 | 38,152 | 2,597.14 |
|  | $(39,442$ 39,801) | $(-1,410 \quad 4,348)$ |  |  |
| Total | 26,656,701 | 28,359,562 | -772,865 | -2.82 |
|  | $(26,465,040 \quad 26,848,362)$ | $(22,868,977 \quad 33,850,147)$ |  |  |

*estimate exclude two anomalous observations that account for 933 k discarded fish

## Calibration results for summer flounder Harvest-at-length



Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions:
Sim. model vs. assessment $p$-value $=0.084$
Sim. model vs. MRIP p-value $=.175$

## Calibration results for summer flounder Discards-at-length



Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions:
Sim. model vs. assessment $p$-value $=0.390$
Sim. model vs. MRIP $p$-value $=0.043$

## Calibration results for black sea bass

## Harvest

Table 1. Simulated vs. estimated 2019 black sea bass harvest (\#'s fish)

| state | Simulation (95\% CI) | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { MRIP } \\ (95 \% \mathrm{CI}) \end{gathered}$ | Difference | \% difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MA | 327,511 | 526,593 | -199,083 | -37.8 |
|  | $(326,810 \quad 328,211)$ | $(321,668$ 731,519) |  |  |
| RI | 456,037 | 517,032 | -60,996 | -11.8 |
|  | $(455,216$ 456,856) | $(337,340$ 696,724) |  |  |
| CT | 668,207 | 515,601 | 152,606 | 29.6 |
|  | $(666,873$ 669,540) | $(276,600 \quad 754,602)$ |  |  |
| NY | 1,575,259 | 157,7042 | -1,783 | -0.1 |
|  | $(1,571,983$ 1,578,534) | $(1,069,013$ 2,085,070) |  |  |
| NJ | 599,326 | 831,241 | -231,915 | -27.9 |
|  | $(597,729600,922)$ | (539,811 1,122,671) |  |  |
| DE | 51,861 | 43,434 | 8,426 | 19.4 |
|  | $(51,758$ 51,962) | $(19,184$ 67,684) |  |  |
| MD | 139,200 | 129,431 | 9,768 | 7.5 |
|  | $(138,939$ 139,460) | $(58,667$ 200,196) |  |  |
| VA | 198,073 | 230,843 | -32,771 | -14.2 |
|  | $(197,808$ 198,336) | (-33,141 494,828) |  |  |
| NC | 221,275 | 151,998 | 69,276 | 45.6 |
|  | $(220,980$ 221,570) | $(-17,270$ 321,268) |  |  |
| Total | 4,236,748 | 4,523,220 | -286,472 | -6.3 |
|  | $(4,228,184$ 4,245,311) | $(3,762,717 \quad 5,283,723)$ |  |  |

## Calibration results for black sea bass Discards

Table 2. Simulated vs. estimated 2019 black sea bass discards (\#'s fish)

| state | Simulation (95\% CI) | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { MRIP } \\ (95 \% \mathrm{CI}) \end{gathered}$ | Difference | \% difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MA | 2,392,956 | 2,728,800 | -335,844 | -12.31 |
|  | $(2,388,455 \quad 2,397,456)$ | $(1,734,077 \quad 3,723,522)$ |  |  |
| RI | 3,263,576 | 8,646,693 | -172,647 | -5.02 |
|  | (3,258,043 3,269,109) | $(6,471,292 \quad 10,821,676)$ |  |  |
| CT | 3,239,776 | 2,624,762 | 615,014 | 23.43 |
|  | $(3,234,031 \quad 3,245,519)$ | $(1,673,134 \quad 3,576,389)$ |  |  |
| NY | 8,596,060 | 9,725,431 | -1,129,371 | -11.61 |
|  | $(8,580,162$ 8,611,958) | $(7,401,427$ 12,048,987) |  |  |
| NJ | 5,367,557 | 5,352,818 | 14,739 | 0.28 |
|  | $(5,352,499$ 5,382,613) | $(4,002,933$ 6,702,703) |  |  |
| DE | 463,846 | 378,300 | 85,545 | 22.61 |
|  | $(463,116$ 464,575) | $(203,933$ 552,667) |  |  |
| MD | 1,240,920 | 1,635,747 | -394,827 | -24.14 |
|  | $(1,238,929 \quad 1,242,909)$ | $(4,005$ 3,267,489) |  |  |
| VA | 1,950,094 | 1,903,352 | 46,742 | 2.46 |
|  | $(1,948,118 \quad 1,952,068)$ | $(1,045,363$ 2,761,340) |  |  |
| NC | 2,708,943 | 2,802,990 | -94,047 | -3.36 |
|  | $(2,706,037$ 2,711,847) | $(1,756,042$ 3,849,9370) |  |  |
| Total | 29,223,726 | 30,588,422 | -1,364,696 | -4.46 |
|  | $(29,169,744$ 29,277,708) | $(26,593,505$ 34,583,339) |  |  |

## Simulation example

- Implemented a variety of regulations across states, holding everything else constant
- Assumed 100\% compliance
- Measured expected changes in angler welfare, harvest, discards, and effort

Actual and hypothetical regulations used in summer flounder simulation.

| State | 2019 actual regulations | 2019 alternative <br> regulations | Change actual $\rightarrow$ <br> alternative |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MA | 5 fish, $17 "$ | 5 fish, $19 "$ | Min. size +2 |
| RI | 6 fish, $19 "$ | 6 fish, $21 "$ | Min. size +2 |
| CT | 4 fish, $19 "$ | 4 fish, $17 "$ | Min. size -2 |
| NY | 4 fish, $19 "$ | 4 fish, $16 "-19 "$ | Slot limit |
| NJ | 3 fish, $18 "$ | 3 fish, $18 "$ | No change |
| DE | 4 fish, $16.5 "$ | 4 fish, $16.5 "$ | No change |
| MD | 4 fish, $16.5 "$ | No harvest | Harvest moratorium |
| VA | 4 fish, $16.5 "$ | No harvest | Harvest moratorium |
| NC | 4 fish, $16.5 "$ | No harvest | Harvest moratorium |

## Simulation results - angler welfare

Expected welfare responses to alternative regulations

| state | Regulation change | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { CV (\$) } \\ (95 \% \mathrm{Cl}) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| RI | $19^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow 21^{\prime \prime}$ min | 5,807,945 |
|  |  | $(4,288,726$ 7,327,164) |
| CT | $19^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow 17^{\prime \prime}$ min | -9,434,245 |
|  |  | $(-11,909,176-6,959,314)$ |
| NY | $19^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow 16^{\prime \prime}-19^{\prime \prime}$ slot | -103,299,312 |
|  |  | $(-130,189,418-76,409,206)$ |
| NJ | No change | -60,721 |
|  |  | $(-151,228$ 29,786) |
| DE | No change | 61,426 |
|  |  | $(44,612 \quad 78,239)$ |
|  | 4 fish, 16.5 " $\rightarrow$ Harvest |  |
| MD | moratorium | 12,329,541 |
|  |  | $(10,463,853 \quad 14,195,228)$ |
|  | 4 fish, 16.5 " $\rightarrow$ Harvest |  |
| VA | moratorium | 12,359,496 |
|  |  | $(10,378,030$ 14,340,962) |
| NC | 4 fish, 16.5 " $\rightarrow$ Harvest |  |
|  | moratorium | 996,390 |
|  |  | $(834,756$ 1,158,025) |
| Total |  | -79,747,696 |
|  |  | $(-10,3296,553-5,6198,839)$ |

[^0]
## Simulation results - harvest

Expected harvest responses to alternative regulations

| state | Regulation change | Change in harvest (\# fish) (95\% CI) | \% change in harvest (\# fish) (95\% CI) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| RI | $19^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow 21^{\prime \prime} \mathrm{min}$ | -72,528 | -69.5 |
|  |  | $(-73,527-71,528)$ | $(-69.78-69.2)$ |
| CT | $19^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow 17^{\prime \prime} \mathrm{min}$ | 149,119 | 163.6 |
|  |  | $(143,972$ 154,266) | $(159.3167 .9)$ |
| NY | $19^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow 16^{\prime \prime}-19^{\prime \prime}$ slot | 1,652,488 | 232.9 |
|  |  | $(1,589,013$ 1,715,964) | $(225.9 \quad 225.9)$ |
| NJ | No change | 1,440 | 0.14 |
|  |  | (725 2,156) | (0.069 0.20) |
| DE | No change | -215 | -0.39 |
|  |  | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}-235 & -196\end{array}\right)$ | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}-0.42 & -0.35\end{array}\right)$ |
| MD | 4 fish, $16.5^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow$ Harvest moratorium | $-75,912$ | $-100$ |
|  |  | $(-76,429 \quad-75,395)$ |  |
| VA | 4 fish, $16.5^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow$ Harvest moratorium | -106,426 | -100 |
|  |  | $(-106,889-105,963)$ | ( ) |
| NC | 4 fish, $16.5^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow$ Harvest moratorium | $-8,660$ | -100 |
|  |  | $(-8,716 \quad-8,604)$ | ( ) |
| Total |  | 1,494,583 | 65.9 |
|  |  | $(1,428,199$ 1,560,966) | $(63.52$ 68.31) |

Expected changes are in relation to actual regulations in 2019

## Simulation results - discards

Expected discard responses to alternative regulations

| state | Regulation change | Change in discards (\# fish) (95\% CI) | \% change in discards (\# fish) (95\% CI) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| RI | $19^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow 21^{\prime \prime}$ min | 14,058 | 1.20 |
|  |  | (872 27,245) | (0.071 2.33) |
| CT | $19^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow 17^{\prime \prime}$ min | -68,641 | -6.69 |
|  |  | $(-85,964-51,317)$ | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}-8.39 & -4.99\end{array}\right)$ |
| NY | $19^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow 16^{\prime \prime}-19^{\prime \prime}$ slot | -729,826 | -8.46 |
|  |  | (-903,398 -556,255) | $(-10.49-6.43)$ |
| NJ | No change | 12,545 | 0.09 |
|  |  | $(7,817$ 17,273) | (0.06 0.13) |
| DE | No change | 493 | 0.07 |
|  |  | (405 580) | (0.06 0.08) |
| MD | 4 fish, $16.5^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow$ Harvest moratorium | 20,475 | 2.26 |
|  |  | $(12,424 \quad 28,527)$ | (1.37 3.16) |
| VA | 4 fish, $16.5^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow$ Harvest moratorium | 55,728 | 4.26 |
|  |  | $(48,546$ 62,911) | (3.70 4.81) |
| NC | 4 fish, $16.5^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow$ Harvest moratorium | 4,956 | 12.51 |
|  |  | $(4,309 \quad 5,603)$ | $(10.8414 .17)$ |
| Total |  | -771,019 | -2.89 |
|  |  | (-932,499 -609,538) | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}-3.50 & -2.27)\end{array}\right.$ |

Expected changes are in relation to actual regulations in 2019

## Simulation results - effort

Expected demand responses to alternative regulations

| state | Regulation change | Change in expected \# trips (95\% CI) | \% change in expected \# trips (95\% CI) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| RI | $19^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow 21^{\prime \prime}$ min | -16,396 | -3.47 |
|  |  | $(-20,797-11,994)$ | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}-4.4 & -2.54\end{array}\right)$ |
| CT | $19^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow 17^{\prime \prime}$ min | 26,625 | 6.4 |
|  |  | $(19,399 \quad 33,851)$ | (4.69 8.19) |
| NY | $19^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow 16^{\prime \prime}-19^{\prime \prime}$ slot | 287,612 | 8.28 |
|  |  | $(209,778$ 365,445) | (6.037 10.51) |
| NJ | No change | 261 | 0.01 |
|  |  | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}-321 & 844)\end{array}\right.$ | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}-0.01 & 0.02)\end{array}\right.$ |
| DE | No change | -142 | -0.04 |
|  |  | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}-178 & -106\end{array}\right)$ | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}-0.04 & -0.03)\end{array}\right.$ |
| MD | 4 fish, $16.5^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow$ Harvest moratorium | -27,129 | -4.98 |
|  |  | $(-31,274-22,983)$ | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}-5.74 & -4.21)\end{array}\right.$ |
| VA | 4 fish, $16.5^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow$ Harvest moratorium |  |  |
|  |  | -22,807 | -2.90 |
|  |  | $(-26,424-19,191)$ | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}-3.36 & -2.44\end{array}\right)$ |
| NC | 4 fish, $16.5^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow$ Harvest moratorium | -1,686 | -6.32 |
|  |  | $(-1,972-1,399)$ | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}-7.39 & -5.25\end{array}\right)$ |
| Total |  | $(200,870)$ | 1.85 |
|  |  | $(128,216$ 273,523) | $\left(\begin{array}{ll}1.18 & 2.51)\end{array}\right.$ |

[^1]
## Other model outputs

- Total summer flounder catch-, harvest-, discards-at-length
- Harvest and discards of other species caught on summer flounder trips


## Goals of this workshop

- Define other types of model outputs that may be important to capture.
- Decide what types of management scenarios are important to model.


## Advantages compared to current process

- Model accounts for:
- changes in availability
- changes in angler behavior/welfare
- species interactions
- Can be used to model the effect of slight to extreme changes in regulations
- With population projections, can be used to model regulations for multiple years


## Feedback from SSC peer review

- SSC peer review comments focused mainly on two concerns

1. Sample selection
2. Out-of-sample predictive power

Thank you!


[^0]:    Expected changes are in relation to actual regulations in 2019

[^1]:    Expected changes are in relation to actual regulations in 2019

